EU
Unpacked

To address these geopolitical challenges, the European Commission drafted a wide-ranging document outlining an urgent necessity for a comprehensive reshuffle of European defence capabilities.  According to the document, decades of underinvestment have significantly weakened Europe’s deterrence posture. Restoring defence readiness requires a collective, strategic approach built on solidarity, increased funding, and coordinated industry efforts. Time is not on the EU’s side. Therefore, it is essential to implement measures determined by this document quickly to achieve tangible results by 2030, safeguard the security of EU citizens and keep the leading position on the global stage.

II – A Rapidly Deteriorating Strategic Context

The White Paper categorises the threats to European security as multifaceted, evolving, and increasingly interconnected across physical, digital, and cognitive domains. These threats can be grouped into several key categories:

a. State-Based Military Threats and Conventional Aggression

The most pressing immediate threat comes from Russia, which, following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has emerged as the main destabilising force in Europe. The conflict in Ukraine has led to hundreds of thousands of casualties and widespread displacement. Russia transitioned to a total war economy, with 40% of its federal budget (9% of GDP) directed toward military spending, it increased its military-industrial capacity, and established closer relations with authoritarian allies such as Belarus, North Korea, and Iran. It is increasingly leaning on nuclear threats and hybrid strategies. At the same time, Russia persistently contributes to instability on the edges of Europe, particularly in Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and the Western Balkans.

The document highlights that if Russia prevails in Ukraine, its ambitions will continue beyond that. The persistent threat of territorial revisionism and neo-imperial ambitions is considered a constant element in European security assessments.

b. Systemic and Strategic Challenge from China

While less immediate, China is presented as a systemic rival, whose model of authoritarian governance, state-led capitalism, and technological ambition poses long-term challenges to European security, economy, and democracy. Key concerns include its opaque and massive defence build-up, which now ranks second globally, only after the United States, as well as rapid advances in cyber, space, and nuclear capabilities. China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific – particularly around Taiwan and in the East and South China Seas – further increases tensions. Moreover, its growing military and economic presence in the South Pacific, Indian Ocean, and beyond reflects broader strategic ambitions. China’s coercive policies, especially through technology, supply chains, and cognitive warfare such as disinformation, undermine European autonomy and could significantly disrupt global trade and access to critical materials in the event of a Taiwan crisis.

c. Fragmentation of the Transatlantic Security Guarantee

Another strategic concern is the relative decline in the US strategic focus on Europe. While NATO remains the cornerstone of European defence, Washington’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific and its calls for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own defence present both a challenge and an opportunity. The EU must fill the gap through burden sharing, capability development, and resilient industrial policy.

d. Hybrid Threats and Technological Confrontation

The White Paper emphasises a rise in hybrid threats that confuse the boundaries between war and peace. These include cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, sabotage of undersea cables and pipelines, disinformation campaigns targeting elections, public health, and trust in democratic institutions, as well as weaponisation of migration as seen in Belarus and elsewhere.

A competitive landscape is also emerging in technologies like AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, hypersonic systems, and autonomous technologies. These are dual-use innovations, increasingly vital for economic rivalry and military superiority.

The EU must urgently enhance research and development, technology sovereignty, and innovation ecosystems to maintain a competitive advantage and avoid dangerous dependencies on external forces.

e. Instability in Europe’s Neighbourhood and Beyond

Another source of threat, which the document emphasises, is the risks coming from persistent instability in North Africa and the Middle East. Conflicts in Libya, Sudan, and the Sahel countries (Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria) contribute to mass migration, organised crime, and terrorism. At the same time, in the Middle East, Iranian activities (including proxy support and missile proliferation) continue to destabilise Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.

In a broader neighbourhood, the Red Sea, Mediterranean, and Arctic are identified as zones of emerging geopolitical competition, affecting trade, energy, and maritime security.

All these developments have direct spillover effects on European energy security, economic resilience, and societal cohesion.

III – European Readiness 2030

The core ambition of the White Paper is to achieve full European defence readiness by 2030, reinforcing not only the EU’s internal security. It emphasises that while NATO remains essential, Europe must do more, not just in terms of investment, but in capability, coordination, and strategic foresight. The EU’s challenge is clear: either Europe strategically adapts and re-arms to defend its values and future, or it risks fragmentation, decline, and irrelevance.

Although the EU will respect national sovereignty over armed forces, it commits to providing added value through coordination, funding, and legislative support. The aim is to prioritise significant investments, reduce bureaucratic obstacles, and facilitate collaborative procurement to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB)[i]. This requires:

• Enhancing collaboration and efficiency in the European defence industry for developing and marketing weapons systems.  
• Facilitating efficiencies, lowering costs, and improving purchasing power for Member States while generating stability and predictability with multi-year industrial demand.
• Supporting dual-use infrastructure for mobility and space communications, navigation, and observation,  
• Enabling partnerships.

The White Paper will be followed by additional strategy documents such as the Preparedness Union Strategy and an Internal Security Strategy, both of which will enhance the EU’s defence efforts with comprehensive crisis readiness.

IV – Closing the Gaps

To deter foreign aggression and address instability, EU Member States must possess the capabilities for various military tasks. Currently, there are critical gaps that hinder them from conducting complex military operations. The White Paper identifies seven critical defence capability gaps:

1. Integrated air and missile defence systems – to counter growing threats from hypersonic and ballistic missiles.
2. Artillery and long-range missile systems – to enable deep precision strike capabilities.
3. Ammunition and missile stockpiles – urgently needed to replenish depleted reserves, especially to support Ukraine.
4. Drone and counter-drone systems – recognising their increasing role in modern warfare.
5. Military mobility infrastructure – streamlining transport of troops and equipment across EU territory and into partner countries.
6. AI, quantum computing, cyber, and electronic warfare – vital for offensive and defensive capabilities in the electromagnetic and digital domains.
7. Strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection – including airlift capacity, surveillance, and secure communications.

The document emphasises that insufficient collaboration among EU member states creates inefficiencies in developing defence capabilities and increases costs for all member states. Addressing these gaps through collaboration provides a “collaborative dividend,” which includes cost efficiency, scalability, and interoperability. Joint procurement reduces expenses, accelerates delivery times, and guarantees interoperability. Initiatives that exceed national capabilities – especially in high-intensity warfare – demand collective EU efforts using established frameworks like EDA[ii], PESCO[iii], OCCAR[iv], and NATO agencies. Member States have pledged to achieve 35% collaborative procurement.

Military Mobility and Infrastructure

The capability of Member States and allied armed forces to quickly deploy troops and equipment across the EU during conflicts or heightened hybrid warfare requires access to essential transport infrastructure suitable for dual purposes. The EU has identified 500 key projects needing investment in four key multi-modal corridors (rail, road, sea, and air). Urgent tasks include simplifying cross-border processes, ensuring prioritised transport access, and enhancing infrastructure that will be both resilient and serve dual purposes, fostering defence capabilities and competitiveness.

This year, the EU plans to adopt a Joint Communication regarding Military Mobility, along with essential legislative proposals:

Border Protection

The Eastern Border Shield – an integrated defence system at the EU’s eastern frontier – is proposed to counter military and hybrid threats from Russia and Belarus, combining physical barriers, infrastructure, and surveillance technologies.

Defence Omnibus

Regulatory complexity hinders the agility of the defence sector. The Commission plans to initiate a Strategic Dialogue with industry and present a Defence Omnibus Simplification package by June 2025, aiming to: streamline certification and environmental permitting, secure supply chains, improve access to finance, enable efficient exchange of sensitive information and accelerate EU defence programme management. At the same time, relevant directives (e.g., procurement, intra-EU transfers, etc.) will also be also revised.

Strategic Stockpiles and Readiness Pools

The EU will support the creation of strategic reserves and defence readiness pools via the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP)[v], focusing on cross-border industrial partnerships, procurement of critical raw materials and components, as well as geographically dispersed stockpiles of EU-made defence products

V – Increase Military Support for Ukraine: The ‘Porcupine Strategy’[vi]

Supporting Ukraine remains the EU’s immediate top priority. Since February 2022, the EU and Member States have provided around EUR 50bn in military support to Ukraine, including through the European Peace Facility[vii].

The document proposes to enhance Ukraine’s defence and security capacity through the “Porcupine Strategy”, which aims to fortify Ukraine’s self-defence capacity with sufficient capabilities to deter any future aggression. EU military support to Ukraine should focus on two mutually reinforcing priorities:

a. Step up EU military and other forms of assistance to Ukraine

The EU and its Member States pledge to provide significant and ongoing military assistance to Ukraine, which includes:

• Ammunition Supply: Deliver at least 2 million large-calibre artillery rounds annually, with immediate financial commitments required to sustain deliveries for 2025 through donations and procurement.
• Air Defence Systems: Initiate a collaborative Air Defence Initiative with Ukraine that emphasises joint procurement and production assistance for ground-based air defence and interceptors, following the “Letter of Intent of November 2024”[viii] endorsed by 18 Member States.
• Drone Capability: Continue supplying drones and enhance Ukraine’s domestic drone production, including EU-Ukrainian industrial joint ventures.
• Training & Brigade Regeneration: Strengthen brigade-level training and equipment support through EUMAM Ukraine,[ix] exceeding 75,000 trained personnel. Improve battlefield support through maintenance, spare parts, and the operational adjustment of EU-supplied equipment. Promote knowledge-sharing based on experiences from the Ukrainian frontline.
• Support to Ukraine’s Defence Industry: Prioritise direct procurement from Ukrainian defence firms (projected 2025 capacity: €35 billion). Funding mechanisms include EU loans via the G7’s ERA initiative[x] and Ukraine Facility[xi], as well as the SAFE instrument[xii], enabling Ukraine’s participation in EU collaborative defence procurements.
• Military Mobility & Logistics: Expand EU military corridors into Ukraine to facilitate faster and integrated military logistics, contributing to deterrence and rapid response.
• Access to EU Space Capabilities: Grant Ukraine access to the EU Space Programme for satellite services and Earth observation, fund commercial satellite support, and promote cyber protection of strategic assets. Encourage Ukraine’s participation in the EU Space ISAC.[xiii]
• Enhanced Coordination Mechanisms: Reinforce the EU Military Staff Clearing House Cell[xiv], ensure alignment with NATO and the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, and propose a joint Task Force to foster deeper cooperation between the EU and Ukrainian defence industries.

b. Associate Ukraine to EU
initiatives to develop defence capabilities and integrate the respective
defence industries

• Ukraine-EU Defence Integration: Ukraine’s frontline experience makes it a key innovation hub for defence technology. Integrating its defence industry with the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) will enhance scalability, modernization, and cost-efficiency.
• EDIP & Collaborative Programs: Fast-tracking the EDIP Regulation will enable Ukraine’s inclusion in EU defence initiatives (e.g., Ukraine Support Instrument, PESCO, CARD), fostering joint innovation and investment.
• Knowledge & Investment Exchange: Expanding the EU Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv and encouraging EU-Ukraine defence collaboration will allow the EU to leverage Ukraine’s combat experience while boosting industrial partnerships.

VI – A Strong and Innovative Defence Industry in Europe

A key element of the strategy is a profound overhaul of the EU defence industrial base. The European defence sector plays a vital role in maintaining defence readiness, effective deterrence, and strategic independence. However, structural weaknesses, such as fragmentation, underinvestment, and slow production capacities, hinder its ability to meet Member States’ needs.  To address these challenges, the EU must foster a more integrated, innovative, and competitive defence industry through six strategic priorities:

1. Boosting Industrial Capacity – Strengthen EU-wide defence production capabilities and repurpose traditional industries (e.g., automotive, steel) to support defence supply chains.
2. Securing Critical Supplies – Reduce dependencies on foreign inputs (e.g., chips, raw materials) through diversified sourcing, joint procurement, and homegrown alternatives.
3. Creating a Single Defence Market – Overcome fragmentation by harmonising procurement rules, facilitating cross-border transfers, and encouraging collaborative EU-wide defence projects.
4. Simplifying existing rules and cutting red tape – Simplify bureaucratic procedures, reduce excessive regulations, accelerate approval procedures, and eliminate unnecessary administrative barriers to make defence acquisition more efficient, timely, and responsive to urgent security needs
5. Driving Innovation – Invest in disruptive technologies (AI, quantum, autonomous systems) via EU funding instruments like the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS)[xv]. Participating in Dual-use Research and Development(R&D) and involving SMES is crucial.
6. Developing Talent – Address skills gaps in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) and emerging tech fields, while reskilling workers from other sectors to support defence industrial expansion.

To reach the listed priorities, the following Key Actions should be undertaken:

• Aggregate Demand: Use multi-year contracts and joint procurement (e.g., EDIRPA[xvi]) to provide industry with predictable orders and incentivize production scaling.
• Military Sales Mechanism: Improve availability and delivery times for European defence equipment.
• Innovation Ecosystem: Leverage EUDIS, HEDI[xvii], and venture capital (e.g., Defence Equity Facility) to fast-track cutting-edge solutions.
• Skills Development: Align defence workforce needs with the Union of Skills initiative, focusing on STEM and digital competencies.

Through the adoption of these measures, the EU can establish a robust and competitive defence industry that strengthens security, decreases reliance on external sources, and propels technological innovation. Urgency is paramount, especially with the swift advancements made by global competitors.

VII – A surge in Defence Spending 

To enhance defence spending and revitalise Europe’s defence industrial sector, the European Commission initiated the ReArm Europe Plan. Since 2021, EU Member States have gradually increased their defence expenditures, amounting to EUR 326 billion in 2024. However, on aggregate, it remains far lower than that of the US and, more worryingly, below that of Russia or China. Transforming European defence demands substantial, long-term investments from both the public and private sectors. With the ReArm Europe Plan, the Commission has identified five pillars to urgently and significantly increase European defence spending.

1. The first pillar introduces the SAFE instrument, providing up to EUR 150 billion in EU-backed loans for national defence investments. Funds prioritise joint procurement of critical capabilities like ammunition, military mobility, air defence, and AI systems. Eligibility requires national defence plans, with incentives including VAT waivers, open contracts, and participation by non-EU partners like Ukraine under agreed conditions.
2. The second pillar proposes the coordinated activation of the Stability and Growth Pact’s national escape clause, allowing Member States to exceed fiscal limits in proportion to their increased defence spending since 2021. This could mobilise up to EUR 800 billion over four years, including SAFE funding.
3. The third pillar focuses on increasing flexibility within existing EU instruments. Member States are encouraged to use the mid-term review of cohesion policy funds to redirect resources toward defence and security priorities. The Commission will soon present a package of measures to facilitate this process, reinforcing the role of the defence industry in regional development.
4. The fourth pillar enhances the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB), which will double its annual investments in defence to EUR 2 billion. It plans to support technologies such as cybersecurity, space systems, and quantum technologies. The EIB will revise its eligibility rules and establish a dedicated public policy goal on European security, replacing its current ad hoc approach.
5. The fifth pillar focuses on mobilising private capital. Recognising that public investment alone is insufficient, the Commission seeks to improve access to finance for defence SMEs, which face significant barriers compared to their civilian counterparts. It will clarify rules under the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation and leverage the proposed Savings and Investment Union to attract more private investment into defence.

Together, all these instruments could mobilise over EUR 800bn in defence investment in the next four years.

To further ensure financial predictability, the Commission will continue exploring new funding mechanisms, including through the ESM.[xviii]

VIII- Enhanced Security Through Partnerships

Given transboundary threats such as cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, and maritime insecurity, the EU will expand its network of bilateral, regional, and multilateral defence partnerships. The EU aims to strengthen global security through deeper cooperation with international partners.

• NATO – NATO remains the core of Europe’s collective defence, with EU-NATO cooperation being reinforced, especially in military mobility, capabilities, and resilience, aligning with both EU and NATO strategic objectives.
• US: The EU continues to strengthen transatlantic defence cooperation with the US, focusing on defence industrial integration and responding to shared security threats.
• UK: Even post-Brexit, the EU is working to develop a more structured defence and security cooperation with the UK, particularly in defence industry collaboration and strategic security matters.
• Norway and Canada: The EU enhances its defence partnerships with Norway and Canada as key NATO allies, concentrating on joint capabilities and security contributions in strategic projects.
• European, enlargement and neighbouring countries: To enhance peace and stability, the EU should foster beneficial security and defence cooperation with like-minded European and neighbouring countries, including Albania, Iceland, Montenegro, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Switzerland.
• Türkiye: Türkiye is a candidate country for EU accession and a partner in Common Security and Defence Policy. The EU will engage constructively to develop a mutually beneficial partnership in all areas of common interest, based on Türkiye’s equal commitment to cooperate on issues important to the EU.
• Indo-Pacific partners (Japan, Korea, Australia, India): The EU is expanding defence and security partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries, aimed at addressing common global security challenges and reducing dependencies on non-European sources for technology and defence capabilities.

These partnership efforts also intend to support capability development, innovation, and reduced strategic dependencies.

IX – Conclusions: The Way Forward for European Defence

The fast-evolving geopolitical landscape and new threats to Europe demand urgent and decisive measures to strengthen European defence capabilities. The European Commission proposed several critical actions to boost defence collaboration among EU Member States, which include:

• Activation of National Escape Clause: Member States are encouraged to request its activation by the end of April 2025 to increase defence spending flexibility.
• Adoption of SAFE Regulation: The draft Regulation on Security and Action for Europe (SAFE) should be urgently adopted by the Council.
• European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP): Adoption of the EDIP, including the Ukraine Support Instrument (USI), is prioritized before Summer.
• Cohesion Fund Adjustments: Changes to the European Regional Development Fund will be proposed by March 2025 to allow funds for defence priorities.
• Collaborative Defence Procurement: Member States are urged to increase collaborative procurement to at least 40% of total defence spending, in line with the European Defence Industry Strategy (EDIS).
• Military Support for Ukraine: A new, ambitious initiative will provide Ukraine with artillery, air defence, and training.
• Integration of Ukrainian Defence Industry: Support for integrating Ukraine’s defence industry into the EU Single Market, along with the extension of military mobility corridors into Ukraine.
• EIB Support: The Commission calls for the European Investment Bank to increase funding for the European defence industry.
• Strategic Dialogue with Defence Industry: A dialogue will be launched with the defence industry, supported by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EU Military Staff.
• Defence Omnibus Proposal: A simplification proposal will be presented by June 2025.
• European Armament Technological Roadmap: A roadmap will be introduced for dual-use technological capabilities by 2025.
• Military Mobility Communication: A Joint communication on Military Mobility will be adopted by the end of 2025, including necessary legislative proposals.

Through these actions, the EU aims to establish a Defence Union that will ensure peace and stability, protect its citizens, and uphold its values. At the same time, increased defence spending is expected to positively influence Europe’s economy by driving innovation, enhancing competitiveness, and creating jobs, while strengthening the EU’s resilience against rising global threats.

The White Paper emphasises that the EU’s identity as a peace project is not abandoned but redefined: credible defence is now seen as a precondition for peace, not its contradiction. Europe needs to prioritise unity and strength instead of complacency and division. The stakes are high – peace, sovereignty, and the resilience of democracy are on the line.

The White Paper makes clear that only through bold action, massive investment, and collective resolve can Europe reclaim strategic autonomy and secure its future in an increasingly dangerous world.

[i] EDTIB – European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; The network of European industries and institutions developing and maintaining defence technologies and production capacities.

[ii] EDA – European Defence Agency; An EU agency that supports Member States in improving their defence capabilities through cooperation, capability development, and joint procurement.

[iii] PESCO – Permanent Structured Cooperation; A framework within the EU that enables willing Member States to pursue greater cooperation in defence projects, jointly developing capabilities and investing in shared priorities.

[iv] OCCAR – Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (from French: Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement); An intergovernmental organisation that manages collaborative European defence equipment programmes efficiently on behalf of its participating nations.

[v] EDIP – European Defence Industry Programme; A EU initiative aimed at strengthening the European defence industrial base by supporting cross-border industrial cooperation, building strategic reserves of critical components and materials, and creating Defence Industrial Readiness Pools for rapid response and resilience.

[vi] Porcupine Strategy – A defence concept focused on making a country or region so well-defended and costly to attack that it deters aggression.

[vii] EPF – European Peace Facility; An off-budget EU instrument established in 2021 to enhance the EU’s ability to prevent conflicts, build peace, and strengthen international security. It allows the EU to fund military and defence assistance to partner countries and regional organisations, including the supply of military equipment (such as the provision of arms to Ukraine). The EPF operates outside the EU’s regular budget due to the prohibition on using EU funds for military operations under the EU treaties.

[viii] The Letter of Intent of November 2024 – refers to a joint political commitment by 18 EU Member States to urgently address Ukraine’s critical air defence needs. This initiative aims to address critical capability gaps by pooling resources and efforts to develop and procure systems like ground-based air defence (GBAD) and counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS). It reflects a strategic move towards greater defence integration within the EU, responding to the evolving security landscape in Europe. While the full list of signatories has not been publicly disclosed, it includes major EU countries such as Germany, France, and Italy, as well as smaller nations like Cyprus and Luxembourg.

[ix] EUMAM Ukraine – European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine; Aimed at providing training and support to Ukraine’s armed forces. The mission was launched to enhance Ukraine’s defence capabilities, enabling them to better defend against Russian aggression.

[x] ERA Initiative – European Defence Research and Innovation Agenda; A European initiative aimed at promoting research, technological development, and innovation within the EU’s defence sector. The ERA Initiative encourages collaboration between Member States, defence industries, and research institutions to advance defence technologies, strengthening Europe’s technological and industrial base and enhancing its strategic autonomy.

[xi] Ukraine Facility – European Union Ukraine Facility; A financial support mechanism established by the European Union to provide funding and assistance to Ukraine in response to the ongoing conflict with Russia. The facility aims to support Ukraine in areas such as military, economic, and humanitarian needs, enhancing its resilience and capacity to defend itself. It also facilitates the provision of non-lethal assistance and contributes to strengthening Ukraine’s institutional framework and governance.

[xii] SAFE Instrument – Securities and Financial Assistance for Europe; A financial instrument of the European Union designed to provide funding to strengthen the financial resilience of the EU and its partners. The SAFE Instrument helps in addressing security and defence challenges by ensuring stable financial support for defence capabilities, facilitating the EU’s broader security objectives.

[xiii] EU Space ISAC – EU Space Infrastructure Coordination and Support Centre; A European initiative aimed at enhancing the protection and resilience of space infrastructures critical to EU security and economy. The EU Space ISAC focuses on improving situational awareness, threat detection, and risk management related to space assets, promoting collaboration between the EU, Member States, and private entities to safeguard Europe’s space capabilities.

[xiv] EU Military Staff Clearing House Cell – A mechanism within the EU Military Staff that serves as a coordination hub for the exchange of information, analysis, and support for EU military operations and activities. The Clearing House Cell ensures streamlined communication and facilitates the provision of military expertise, helping to enhance the EU’s operational capabilities in security and defence-related matters.

[xv] EUDIS – European Defence Industry Strategy; A strategic framework developed by the European Union to strengthen the competitiveness, innovation, and resilience of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). EUDIS sets out key priorities and actions to enhance the EU’s defence industrial capacity, support joint procurement, foster innovation, and ensure the EU’s strategic autonomy in defence production and supply chains.

[xvi] EDIRPA – European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act; A legislative initiative by the EU aimed at strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) by encouraging and financially supporting joint procurement of defence products among Member States. EDIRPA helps reduce fragmentation, increase interoperability, and ensure more efficient use of defence budgets, particularly in response to urgent capability needs heightened by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

[xvii] HEDI – Hybrid and Exponential Disruptive Technologies Initiative; An EU initiative aimed at identifying, supporting, and integrating emerging and potentially disruptive technologies, such as AI, quantum computing, and advanced materials, into the defence sector. HEDI focuses on harnessing the dual-use potential of civilian innovation for military applications and fostering collaboration between innovators, industry, and defence stakeholders to strengthen the EU’s technological edge and strategic autonomy.

[xviii] ESM – European Stability Mechanism; A permanent crisis resolution mechanism for euro area countries, established in 2012. The ESM provides financial assistance to eurozone members experiencing or threatened by severe financing problems, thereby safeguarding financial stability in the euro area. It offers tools such as precautionary credit lines, loans, and support for bank recapitalisation, typically linked to reform commitments. While primarily economic, the ESM contributes to the EU’s broader resilience and strategic stability.