Commentary

This sustained cooperation has manifested in number of key dimensions: the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), launched at the 2014 Wales Summit and then refreshed and enhanced with expanded ambitions; the establishment of the Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC) in 2015 under SNGP, hosting NATO/partner exercises, which has since become its flagship initiative; Georgia’s long-term participation in NATO missions and operations being first the largest and later a significant non-NATO troop contributor to ISAF and RSM; serving as a security provider, by offering Tbilisi International Airport as a transit hub during the 2021 Allied withdrawal from Afghanistan; Georgia’s participation as the first non-member state in the NATO maritime security Operation Sea Guardian (OSG) since 2023; Georgia’s inclusion among the first NATO partners in the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) in 2023, combining political and practical cooperation to advance integration; consistent engagement through the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) and the Annual National Programme (ANP).

For years, Georgia was praised for its effective cooperation with NATO across these areas. Despite some ups and downs, Georgia’s dignified homeworking was unquestionable—until its current leadership lost the Allies’ trust by straying from NATO’s core values and strategic commitments.

Georgia is no longer viewed as a consistent pro-EU and pro-NATO reform leader, and its credibility has eroded. Concerns over the rule of law, media freedom, civil society space, and politicisation have seriously weakened Georgia’s standing. The mass arrests of opposition leaders, journalists, civic activists, respected professionals, students, and citizens protesting the government’s anti-Western course have shattered the internal political cohesion necessary for stable democratic development and a European future.

 The government’s portrayal of Western partners as hostile actors allegedly plotting regime change and intentionally pushing Georgia into war with Russia has further deepened the rift. Strategic communication projects once jointly developed with NATO and EU partners—especially with strong UK involvement—unsurprisingly disappeared. Ironically, the state’s propaganda apparatus, led by senior officials, has become the main source of disinformation and brainwashing on a daily basis. Some Western ambassadors and visiting on rare occasions officials now face open hostility and public defamation from Georgian authorities—an unprecedented diplomatic decline.

Preoccupied with spreading propaganda, the government is deliberately isolating Georgia from the West. No space remains to advocate for Georgia in NATO or EU corridors, and even long-standing allies who consistently championed Georgia’s integration are no longer doing so. Experienced and respected Georgian diplomats have been dismissed for defending constitutional principles and opposing the government’s abandonment of EU integration, along with dedicated public servants in the Ministry of Defence and other institutions.

These developments have severely damaged Georgia’s NATO integration process, both politically and practically. The submission of the 17th Annual National Programme (ANP)—a key instrument of integration exclusively granted to Georgia since 2009—has been stalled for the first time. Its vital assessment cycle, coordinated with NATO through the NGC, has also been disrupted.

The ANP, a practical dimension of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process, in which Georgia has not been formally involved, enabled the country to achieve exceptional interoperability with NATO through once membership-driven reforms in democracy, human rights, media freedom, parliamentary oversight, judiciary, defence, maritime and coast guard capabilities, energy security, and more. Its effective implementation remains a political and practical prerequisite for progress. The 2023 Vilnius Summit communiqué, for the first time, emphasised the value of making full use of the ANP to advance Georgia’s integration.

Previously, Georgia, with various levels of success, showed a dignified approach to its homework that first and foremost benefited its citizens and the country. However, cooperation within the oldest integration mechanism—the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC)—has sharply declined. Once a vibrant platform for political dialogue—averaging 15 sessions annually—it is now scarcely active. During the last visit of the Georgian PM Kobakhidze to NATO HQ, held in February 2024, some serious concerns were raised, although hope remained among individual Allies and NATO as a whole. Georgia’s position has deteriorated since then. Following Vilnius, significant references to Georgia in NATO summit statements have almost completely disappeared. The anniversary summit in Washington was attended only at the level of the FM in the framework of sideline events. Lastly, Georgia was completely absent from the 2025 Hague summit. 

As a result, years of diplomatic effort and progress have come to a halt. Limited defence cooperation continues but is increasingly jeopardised by political tensions. Signs of deterioration include cancelled or suspended SNGP initiatives and reduced Allied financial support for Georgia’s defence capability development.

NATO once saw Georgia not just as a security consumer but as a capable provider—a reputation built through the sacrifice of Georgian soldiers, 32 of whom gave their lives and others were heavily wounded while defending Georgia’s interests by contributing to the shared Euro-Atlantic security in NATO missions and operations. Preserving and restoring that trust is now Georgia’s urgent task.

Reviving trust will require time and effort, but it is not a “mission impossible.” Georgia must shift from survival mode to operational mode—the mindset that once enabled its NATO and EU aspirations. To ensure lasting success, visible and verifiable reforms must restore democratic credibility and strategic alignment with Euro-Atlantic values.

The equation is clear and rational: Georgia’s progress toward the EU equals its progress toward NATO. The window for regaining momentum remains open but is narrowing fast. Reinstating political commitment, restoring diplomatic dialogue with Allies, and repealing legislation that undermined Georgia’s image are essential.

Having this chapeau in place is absolutely necessary for further steps towards a reinvigorated NATO integration process. The due implementation of all integration mechanisms—the NGC, ANP, and SNGP—should be a priority, with an even more ambitious focus on them. Demonstrating de facto MAP compliance by delivering tangible reforms, including those set by the EU, would make ANP more result-oriented and membership-driven, or even enough to be considered a MAP-by-performance model.

There is no doubt that Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine reaffirmed NATO’s open-door policy when Finland and Sweden were admitted at speed in 2023 and 2024. By taking them on board, the Alliance strongly signalled the credibility of values plus the capability bar for entry, especially under wartime pressure. Values are now a hard filter, and high readiness matters more than ever. 

Georgia, by strengthening its reforms and enhancing cooperation under the SNGP, can once again prove itself a reliable, interoperable, and values-driven partner.

Ultimately, a reformed, more resilient, and strategically realigned Georgia can reclaim its position as a frontrunner aspirant—prepared for a political opening.

But before that, the Battle for Georgia must be won—to secure its place on the right side of history.

The place where it has always belonged.

November 2025