Commentary

Recently, across the region, political and strategic dynamics have been rewritten. Azerbaijan’s full restoration of control over Karabakh and its assertive infrastructure policy turned Baku into a gatekeeper of East–West transit. Supported by Türkiye, it has invested heavily in ports, railways, and logistics hubs, positioning itself as a central axis of the Middle Corridor, the corridor where Georgia was, and I hope still plays an important role, where a strategic partnership between the two countries created an effective transport route for landlocked countries, especially for central Asian ones and wider on.

In recent years, however, the once natural and smooth transport partnership between Baku and Tbilisi has begun to show strain. While Azerbaijan historically viewed Georgia as its indispensable transit outlet to the Black Sea, emerging divergences over cargo prioritisation and infrastructure pace have produced tensions. Azerbaijani logistics operators increasingly complain about rail and highway congestion, leading to higher costs and shipment delays. At the same time, Georgia’s infrastructure stagnation, especially the delayed modernisation of the Tbilisi-Batumi and Tbilisi-Kars railways, as well as the main highways connecting Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to the Georgian Black Sea ports and Georgian Turkish border, has reduced cargo throughput capacity, pushing Baku to seek solutions.

From Baku’s perspective, leverage is shifting. As Azerbaijan grows economically and becomes a logistical anchor for Central Asian exports, Georgia needs Azerbaijan at least as much as Azerbaijan needs Georgia. Without clarity, Tbilisi risks losing not only cargo volumes, but also political relevance in the East-West value chain. The corridor that once depended on Georgia could one day function around Georgia.

Türkiye itself continues to get more benefits and expand its influence, seeing transport and energy corridors not only as trade arteries, but also as instruments for geopolitical leverage. Its alignment with Baku strengthens the Caspian–Black Sea axis and places Ankara at the intersection of NATO interests, Central Asian outreach, and the future of the Middle Corridor. The United States, after years of relative distance, has returned with strategic intent. Washington now views the South Caucasus as critical to European energy diversification, to stabilising Armenia’s security environment, and to balancing Russian and Chinese ambitions.

China, while more cautious, sees opportunity. With the Northern Corridor through Russia constrained by war and sanctions, Beijing evaluates the Middle Corridor as a viable alternative if it is reliable, predictable, and cost-efficient. China’s interest is transactional: it invests where infrastructure works, bureaucracy is light, and risk is low.

In parallel, the European Union, once quite redundant to engage in the processes, became more active. Its engagement within the South Caucasus region and specially in Central Asia, became a major development shaping the wider region’s architecture. With the EU-Central Asia Leaders’ Summit held in 2025, the most ambitious format yet for institutionalising cooperation between the EU and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan came into existence. For the first time, the EU offered a structured connectivity agenda backed by financing for:

• expanding Trans-Caspian transport capacity;
• harmonising customs procedures;
• critical minerals supply to the EU;
• renewable energy corridors;
• digital and cybersecurity cooperation and
• visa facilitation for business and scientific exchange.

One of the most notable messages was that Brussels seeks direct and reliable access to Central Asia, diversifying away from Russia and reducing dependency on maritime chokepoints. In this context, Georgia was expected to be a natural anchor across the Black Sea, but political ambiguity in Tbilisi has raised concerns about long-term commitment and reliability.

The momentum intensified further when, in December 2025, the President of the European Commission visited Astana, Tashkent and Bishkek, signing preliminary framework agreements on critical raw materials, green hydrogen pipelines, and digital corridor projects. European officials made statements that Europe needs “a secure, fast, rules-based bridge to Central Asia,” while discussions reportedly included contingency routes that could bypass some of the South Caucasus countries if governance risks persist. I consider that this was a message, not a threat, first of all to Georgia. A reminder that opportunity is not permanent.

In the middle of this rapidly evolving strategic map stands Georgia, advantaged by geography yet increasingly vulnerable due to internal choices. For years, Georgia was celebrated as the most reform-driven and pro-Western actor in the region, a country whose stability and governance attracted investment, connectivity projects, and Western political support. Today, that image is under strain.

Since late 2024, domestic politics have taken a sharp turn. The government’s announcement to suspend the EU integration process until 2028, combined with laws restricting civil society and independent media, has sparked serious concern in Brussels and Washington. These steps contradict the spirit of Articles 2 and 49 of the Treaty on European Union, which define democratic institutions, judicial independence, and protection of fundamental rights as the foundations for EU membership.

Public reaction inside Georgia has been overwhelming. For more than a year, on a daily basis, thousands have marched in Tbilisi and across the regions, demanding a return to the European path, the release of political detainees, and free elections under international oversight. Polling remains clear and consistent: over 80% of Georgians support EU membership, one of the highest pro-European mandates anywhere on the continent. A widening gap has emerged between society and the governing elite, creating a legitimacy crisis that now directly shapes the country’s foreign policy space.

This political uncertainty has consequences beyond values and diplomacy, it affects Georgia’s strategic relevance. Investors look for predictability. Corridor projects require long planning cycles, billions in financing, and trust that the host country will remain stable and Western-aligned. As Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and even Armenia accelerate modernisation and regulatory reform, Georgia risks losing its competitive edge. Without clarity, Georgia could become a transit stop rather than a strategic platform.

Infrastructure amplifies these concerns. The Tbilisi-Batumi railway remains slow and capacity-constrained. The Anaklia Deep Sea Port, which could connect Georgia to global shipping routes capable of receiving Panamax vessels, remains stalled. Digital integration is slow, customs modernisation is incomplete, and automated data exchange systems are fragmented. Meanwhile:

• Azerbaijan heavily invests in ports, railways, and logistics;
• Kazakhstan expands ferry fleets and Aktau/Kuryk terminals;
• Uzbekistan builds inland logistics hubs linked to China-Europe routes;
• EU–Central Asia cooperation is accelerating without Georgia at the table.

This is how relevance fades, not abruptly, but gradually.

Meanwhile, Western powers are watching closely. They see opportunity in Georgia, but make conditions clear: Western alignment requires democratic governance. China participates commercially if stability is guaranteed. And Russia seeks delay, confusion, and fragmentation, not development.

The stakes are therefore existential, not technical. The future of Georgia is tied to its civilizational choice: remain anchored in a Euro-Atlantic system, or enter a grey zone of contested influence where sovereignty becomes negotiable and opportunity scarce.

The window is real, but it is narrowing. To remain a central node in regional connectivity, Georgia must:

1. Restore political trust with the EU and U.S. through democratic reforms and electoral integrity;
2. Unblock Anaklia Deep Sea Port and complete railway modernisation;
3. Invest in cyber resilience and counter-disinformation aligned with Euro-Atlantic security frameworks;
4. Reaffirm publicly that Georgia’s place is in Europe and NATO.

None of this is beyond reach. The public mandate exists, the geographic advantage remains, and international support is abundant if Georgia chooses it.

The future is not predetermined. It depends on leadership, public resolve, and alignment with Europe’s shifting strategic architecture. The EU is building a new corridor to Central Asia, with or without Georgia. If we stand still, routes will simply bend elsewhere. If we move with conviction, Georgia can become not only a passage, but a platform, a hub, a stakeholder, and a strategic partner shaping the future of Eurasia.

History offers moments of choice. 2025 is one of them.

December 2025