Commentary

North Korea: From Isolation to Indispensability

North Korea’s military-industrial base, long ridiculed in Western policy circles as outdated and inefficient, has unexpectedly emerged as a crucial enabler of Russia’s artillery-centric campaign in Ukraine. According to multiple reports, Pyongyang has supplied Moscow with millions of artillery shells – munitions that are indispensable in the type of grinding, attritional warfare we observe in Ukraine. In an era where high-intensity industrial warfare has re-emerged, such large-scale, state-controlled arms production has proven more strategically valuable than many of the West’s boutique precision-guided systems, which are constrained by limited production capacity, complex supply chains, and layers of public oversight and regulatory accountability (BBC 2024).

In stark contrast, the European Union, despite its economic and technological ability, has struggled to meet Ukraine’s growing demand for basic munitions like 155mm artillery shells. The EU’s initial pledge to deliver one million rounds to Ukraine within 12 months has faced delays due to fragmented defence industries, underinvestment in large-scale ammunition manufacturing, and the slow pace of ramping up production lines. Unlike North Korea’s militarised autarky, where the arms industry operates with little regard for civilian needs or economic efficiency, European countries must balance defence production with legal constraints, environmental standards, and democratic scrutiny. These structural limitations have hindered the EU’s ability to respond swiftly to wartime needs, despite recent moves to boost shell output through initiatives like the “Act in Support of Ammunition Production” (European Commission, ASAP 2023).

The war in Ukraine has exposed a fundamental divergence between authoritarian and democratic defence models: one prioritising quantity, speed, and state control, as the other evaluates the consequences of arms sales transparency, market-driven defence sectors, and sustainability. As the conflict continues, the strategic advantage might briefly lean towards systems that can mass-produce military equipment at scale, prompting challenging questions for Europe regarding its readiness, resilience, and the future of its security framework.

Iran’s Asymmetric Technological Leverage

Iran’s Shahed-131 and -136 drones, although simple in design, have significantly disrupted Ukrainian infrastructure (Cronin 2023). They represent the strategic dividends of low-cost, scalable technology that can bypass Western air defence capacity. Iran’s sanctions-hardened military economy and asymmetric innovation provide Russia with tools for psychological and infrastructural attrition as an alternative to conventional superiority.

These drones, initially seen as simple or ineffective, have proven that by launching swarms of cheap munitions, Russia can deplete Ukraine’s expensive Western interceptor supplies, forcing tough tactical decisions. The Shaheds serve as tools of strategic erosion, targeting energy grids, civilian morale, and the logistics of Ukrainian resistance. Moreover, Iran’s ability to mass-produce such drones despite decades of sanctions illustrates the adaptive potential of grey-zone warfare economies. This model of asymmetric capacity-building offers a blueprint not only for Russia but also for other revisionist powers seeking to challenge conventional superiority without engaging in direct technological competition.

Eritrea: Authoritarianism as a Strategic Asset

Though Eritrea and geopolitics might appear contradictory to most political scientists, the country’s importance in contemporary geopolitical dynamics arises not from its economic power or technological progress, but from its well-established militarised dictatorship. The regime’s indefinite national service program, which amounts to a form of institutionalised conscription, provides it with a standing force and a flexible reserve of human capital ready to serve both military and civil functions. Combined with a command-style economy and one-party control, this system ensures Eritrea’s ability to mobilise resources without the delays, dissent, or accountability mechanisms that constrain liberal democracies. In doing so, Eritrea emerges as a reliable ally for powers seeking partners unbound by international norms or human rights restraints. Its isolation from the global order becomes an asset, allowing it to engage in proxy activities without facing the same reputational or diplomatic costs incurred by more visible or democratic actors (Plaut 2016). Eritrea exemplifies how marginal autocracies, once dismissed as irrelevant, can carve out geopolitical relevance by offering ideological loyalty and operational discretion. The same could be true for North Korea’s military, a fully controlled and indoctrinated force where soldiers are products of a totalitarian system rather than human beings whose lives are Priceless and in conflicts like Ukraine, North Korea’s disciplined, loyal troops represent a cheap and reliable resource pool for Kremlin autocrats.

Implications for Western Strategic Thought

These developments challenge the established view that strength flows from democratic legitimacy and institutional transparency. Instead, regimes labelled as threats to the “rules-based order” are now critical enablers of one of the largest conflicts in Europe since 1945. Their capacity for coercion, mobilisation, and information control is no longer merely oppressive but militarily effective (Mazarr 2018).

Autocracies such as North Korea, Iran, and Eritrea are unburdened by electoral accountability or civil society oversight, enabling them to sustain unpopular or morally questionable policies, such as indefinite conscription or arms exports to aggressor states, without internal resistance. Their contribution to Russia’s war has revealed an emerging ecosystem of authoritarian interoperability, where logistical support, political alignment, and military utility converge. This represents a practical alliance rather than ideological unity. For Western politicians, decision makers, and strategic planners, this presents a dilemma: how to counter adversaries supported by systems that can absorb pain, bypass rules, and convert repression into battlefield advantage?

 

Conclusion

The ad hoc coalition of autocratic regimes assisting Russia is not a formal bloc but a pragmatic alignment grounded in regime survival and anti-Western sentiment. Their collective ability to act with impunity, mobilise at scale, and sidestep normative constraints makes them indispensable in modern conflict. Therefore, the strategic utility of rogue states must be re-evaluated. Far from irrelevant, they are shaping a new matrix of global war—one where liberal norms are liabilities and repression is a resource.

It also raises uncomfortable questions about the limits of liberal deterrence. Can open societies, bound by legal norms and public consensus, compete against regimes that treat citizens as expendable assets and war as an extension of authoritarian governance? The effectiveness of such regimes in asymmetric support roles may force democracies to rethink assumptions about deterrence, resilience, and the role of mass industrial warfare in the 21st century. Without this recalibration, Western deterrence may falter—not from lack of values, but from misjudging the evolving strategic landscape.

Bibliography

BBC. 2023. “North Korea sending Russia military equipment, US claims.” BBC News, October 14, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67109719.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2023. Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation Is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

European Commission, ASAP – Boosting Defence Production, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en.

Mazarr, Michael J. 2018. “The Once and Future Order: What Comes after Hegemony?” Foreign Affairs 97 (1): 25–32.

Plaut, Martin. 2016. Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa’s Most Repressive State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.