Commentary

Peace Process and Regional Connectivity

Pashinyan described the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process as a historic turning point. According to his remarks, the declaration signed in Washington on August 8, 2025, effectively established peace between the two countries and opened the door to new economic cooperation and regional transport links.

The Armenian Prime Minister emphasised that normalisation could enable the reopening of transport routes and the restoration of economic connections throughout the region. Such developments could transform the South Caucasus into a strategic corridor linking Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and China.

These developments are part of Armenia’s broader strategic initiative known as the “Crossroads of Peace,” aimed at positioning the country as a regional transit hub connecting north–south and east–west transport routes.

He also highlighted the importance of reopening logistical routes through Azerbaijan. According to Pashinyan, the inaugural train transporting goods arrived in Armenia via Azerbaijan in 2025, traversing Georgia—an event he described as a symbolic milestone toward regional connectivity and economic normalisation.

Although Pashinyan has not explicitly stated it, Georgia’s current authoritarian regime of the “Georgian Dream” party attempted to impede the process by demanding exorbitant payments that substantially exceeded the customary amount. This issue was ultimately resolved due to public pressure exerted by both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Concurrently, Russia is obstructing the restoration of direct railway connections between Armenia and Azerbaijan by maintaining control over the Armenian railway. These two processes, when combined, effectively aimed to undermine the regional independence of the South Caucasus from Russian influence.

Armenia’s European Integration Strategy

Another key message in Pashinyan’s speech was Armenia’s clear commitment to deepening its integration with the European Union.

Armenia has already adopted legislation initiating the process of EU accession, signalling a long-term strategic shift in its foreign policy orientation toward Europe. This legislative move reflects Armenia’s growing political and economic engagement with the EU, as well as its intention to pursue democratic reforms aligned with European standards.

However, Armenia’s geography presents structural challenges. As a landlocked country without a direct border with the European Union, Armenia must rely on regional transit routes to maintain its connection with Europe.

Two main options exist: Georgia or Türkiye. Although Türkiye theoretically could serve as an economic corridor, the country’s own EU accession process remains stalled, and bilateral challenges persist in Armenia-Türkiye relations. Consequently, this route is not currently considered a viable pathway for Armenia’s EU integration, but rather a potential economic corridor. Thus, the Georgian route remains Armenia’s primary gateway to Europe — a point Pashinyan explicitly emphasised

Georgia: Armenia’s Gateway to the European Union

It was in this context that Pashinyan made one of the most notable remarks of his speech. Addressing Members of the European Parliament, he stated that “the biggest problem on Armenia’s EU integration path at the moment is the frozen state of the political dialogue between the EU and Georgia.”

He stressed that Georgia serves as Armenia’s gateway to the European Union, noting that Armenia began accelerating its own EU integration efforts after Georgia obtained EU candidate status in December 2023. For Yerevan, the deterioration of EU–Georgia relations therefore creates uncertainty not only for Georgia itself but also for Armenia’s European trajectory.

Regional Implications

Pashinyan’s statement reflects a broader regional reality: political developments in the South Caucasus are increasingly interconnected. Armenia’s European ambitions depend not only on domestic reforms but also on the geopolitical orientation of its neighbours—first and foremost, Georgia, which has traditionally served as the main transit and political bridge between the South Caucasus and the Euro-Atlantic world

When relations between Tbilisi and Brussels deteriorate, the consequences extend beyond Georgia’s domestic politics and affect the strategic environment of the entire region. In this sense, Pashinyan’s remarks can be interpreted as both a diplomatic appeal and a strategic signal.

On the one hand, he called for renewed constructive dialogue between the European Union and Georgia. On the other hand, his statement highlights how critical Georgia remains for maintaining the regional balance between European integration and competing geopolitical influences.

Where Is Georgia Heading?

Recent developments illustrate the contrast between Armenia’s European trajectory and the political direction currently taken by Georgia’s ruling authorities.

While the authoritarian regime controlled by the Russian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili introduced the first “Russian-style foreign agents law” in 2023—widely interpreted as an attempt to derail Georgia’s European path—Armenia was simultaneously preparing its own European trajectory. Yerevan invited the European Union monitoring mission to its borders and actively lobbied European partners, particularly in France, to support Georgia’s candidate status.

After Georgia received EU candidate status in December 2023, Armenia initiated the signing of a strategic partnership document with Georgia in early 2024 that included commitments to “common European values.”

When the document was signed in Brussels on April 5, 2024, Pashinyan met with Ursula von der Leyen and Antony Blinken, agreeing on a roadmap aimed at diversifying Armenia’s economy and gradually reducing dependence on the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union.

Later developments further illustrated the divergence. While it is hard to pin down what or whom Georgian Dream politicians mean by the “global war party,” the amorphous term has been used as a dog whistle to castigate perceived opponents: at various times, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council, the U.S. Congress, the U.S. State Department, the Georgian opposition United National Movement, and Swiss banks. But with increasing speed, Ivanishvili’s government is criticising Brussels and Washington, coping with narratives of Moscow.

Shortly afterwards, when Armenia began initiating a referendum on EU membership, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze froze Georgia’s EU integration process—an action widely viewed as contradicting Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which commits the country to European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Since then, while Armenia has been progressing towards closer ties with the European Union, Georgia has increasingly distanced itself. Economic challenges have also emerged, leading to a de facto partial blockade by Georgia against Armenia that has impacted its trade since the spring of 2025. Similarly, military supplies from France to Armenia via Georgia were halted by Georgia in contradiction to its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement that there is no legal basis for halting supplies when responding to criticism from Azerbaijan.

Armenian Prime-Minister Nikol Pashinyan is fully aware that the issue at hand does not originate from the Georgian nation or the Georgian state, but rather from Russia and its political influence exerted through oligarchic networks.

During his recent visit to Georgia, days prior to his address to the European Parliament, he asserted that Armenia prioritises Georgia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence—a concept employed for the first time in bilateral relations. However, the question remains: political independence from whom?

The Georgian public provides the answer through daily protests that commenced on November 28, 2024: Russia and its local authoritarian regime.

Simultaneously, Armenia now confronts a comparable challenge: another Russian-affiliated oligarch, Samvel Karapetyan, attempting to influence Armenia’s upcoming elections and undermine democratic institutions by utilising democratic processes as instruments of hybrid warfare—the very method that facilitated Ivanishvili’s consolidation of power in Georgia following 2012.

Conclusion

Pashinyan’s speech in the European Parliament highlights that the South Caucasus is entering a new phase of geopolitical transformation. The emerging peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the reopening of regional transport routes, and Armenia’s growing integration with Europe are reshaping the region’s strategic landscape.

At the same time, the sustainability of these developments remains closely tied to Georgia’s political trajectory. If Georgia serves as the primary corridor connecting the South Caucasus with Europe, the nature of its relationship with the European Union will inevitably influence not only its own future but also the strategic choices of its neighbours.

To ensure the survival of Armenian democracy, the implementation of the TRIPP agreement, the preservation of regional peace, and long-term stability in the South Caucasus, the European Union and the broader West must significantly enhance their focus on Georgia’s unprecedented state capture.

Without a democratic and European-oriented Georgia, Armenia cannot remain for long a democratic island surrounded by a sea of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, saving Georgia’s democracy is crucial not only for Georgia but also for protecting Armenia’s democratic path and ensuring the stability and democratic future of the entire Caucasian region.

March 2026