Commentary

Viktor Orbán: From Reformist to Illiberal Power Consolidator

Viktor Orbán represents a highly unconventional figure in European politics. Over the past decade, his nationalist and Eurosceptic policies have posed persistent challenges to EU leadership. At the beginning of his political career, in the 1990s, Orbán and his party, Fidesz – then a member of the European People’s Party – were strong advocates of Hungary’s integration into the EU and NATO. However, sixteen years in power have transformed Orbán from a young reformer into a leader increasingly associated with the misuse of power, corruption, anti-European rhetoric, and closer ties with the Kremlin.

This transformation was not immediate; it was gradual. Since 2010, Orbán’s government has systematically consolidated power, introducing nearly fifty constitutional amendments. Alongside these, significant changes were made to the electoral code: the number of parliamentary seats was reduced from 386 to 199, the two-round voting system was replaced by a single round, and electoral districts were redrawn in a manner that significantly disadvantaged opposition parties. As a result, in the 2014, 2018, and 2022 elections, Fidesz – despite receiving a smaller overall share of votes – managed to retain a constitutional majority in parliament. Over the last decade, Hungary has evolved into a system where state institutions, the judiciary, financial resources, and the information space are largely aligned with a single political force.

This concentration of power has had tangible consequences. It has contributed to rising corruption and has weakened economic performance. Today, Hungary ranks among the lowest-tier EU countries in terms of GDP per capita.

Orbán’s role in European politics is particularly notable for its disruptive dimension. He has repeatedly used Hungary’s veto power on key EU decisions, including financial support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia.

Péter Magyar: An Insider-Turned-Challenger

Péter Magyar is not a traditional opposition figure emerging from outside the system. On the contrary, he was previously part of the very political structure created by Viktor Orbán.

Magyar and his former wife, Judit Varga – Hungary’s Minister of Justice from 2019 to 2023 – were once considered a prominent power couple within Hungary’s political establishment. During this period, Magyar served on the board of the Hungarian Development Bank and led the state student loan agency Diákhitel Központ.

Varga stepped down from politics in 2024 following a controversial pardon scandal involving an individual with close ties to the ruling elite and convicted in a child abuse case, which triggered widespread public outrage. In the aftermath of this scandal, Magyar entered politics, distanced himself from the ruling elite, and became a vocal critic of Orbán. He divorced from his wife, and this separation further evolved into an open political confrontation.

Magyar’s criticism focuses primarily on systemic corruption, which he attributes to the concentration of power and the weakening of institutional independence under Orbán’s rule.

Importantly, Magyar and his party TISZA do not differ radically from Fidesz in ideological terms. Their positions are often similar, particularly on issues such as migration and national sovereignty. As a result, Magyar’s campaign is not ideologically driven, but rather pragmatic – centred on improving governance, combating corruption, strengthening institutions, and restoring relations with the European Union.

While Orbán’s governance model relies on centralisation and entrenched networks of influence, Magyar advocates for decentralisation, transparency, and institutional accountability. However, even in the event of political change, rapid transformation is unlikely. Fidesz’s deep institutional entrenchment and loyal networks across key state structures will act as significant constraints on systemic reform.

Foreign Policy: Continuity or Adjustment?

In recent years, Hungary’s foreign policy has increasingly served the interests of the ruling elite rather than the state as a whole. Despite being a member of both the EU and NATO, Hungary has maintained close ties with Russia, particularly in the energy sector.

This approach frequently clashes with EU positions. Hungary has repeatedly used its veto to block collective decisions, including major financial assistance packages for Ukraine. In response, the EU has withheld approximately €17 billion in funding from Hungary, dealing a significant blow to its economy.

If political change occurs, Hungary’s foreign policy tone is likely to become more pragmatic and less confrontational, particularly towards the EU. A Magyar-led government would likely seek to rebuild trust with Brussels, restore institutional cooperation, and regain access to EU financial instruments.

However, a rapid geopolitical shift is unlikely. Hungary’s dependence on Russian energy, combined with entrenched institutional structures, will limit the new government’s room for manoeuvre. A gradual adjustment rather than a radical reorientation is the more plausible scenario.

If Orbán remains in power, Hungary’s current trajectory will continue: selective cooperation with the EU combined with periodic confrontation. Budapest will likely pursue a balancing strategy, maintaining pragmatic ties with the United States while deepening economic relations – especially in energy  – with Russia and China. This balance, however, remains fragile and dependent on multiple factors, including the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

External Actors and Competing Interests

As noted, the elections hold significant importance for external actors.

For Russia, Hungary serves as an anchor – to some extent, a Trojan horse within the European Union – enabling Moscow to exert influence over European policymaking. The close cooperation between Hungary and Russia is well illustrated by a widely reported account in the Western press of a telephone conversation between Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orbán. According to these reports, the Hungarian Prime Minister expressed strong and wide-ranging support for Putin and likened himself to a mouse from a well-known Hungarian fable that comes to the aid of a lion.

If this is considered alongside the regular telephone exchanges between Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó, and Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov – during which the Hungarian side is reported to have shared information about closed-door sessions of the Council of the European Union – it becomes clear just how significant the Orbán government is for the Russian leadership.

As for the United States, attitudes toward Orbán’s government are far from uniform. The Trump administration views Viktor Orbán as an ideological ally and regards his system of governance as a political model whose experience is worth considering. This position was once again underscored by Vice President J.D. Vance during his pre-election visit to Budapest, where he publicly expressed support for Orbán, criticised European Union policies, and accused “Brussels bureaucracy” of interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

Despite these statements, it is unlikely that such support from the US administration is merely an expression of ideological solidarity or personal sympathy. Rather, it appears to form part of a broader strategic approach aimed at strengthening anti-liberal and nationalist forces in Europe, and thereby weakening unity within the European Union.

For the European Union, Hungary represents a systemic problem. On the one hand, it is a member state, on the other, its policies frequently obstruct common decisions.

Should Viktor Orbán remain in power, the European Union will be compelled to continue – and likely intensify – the use of financial leverage against Hungary. However, as has already been demonstrated on multiple occasions, such an approach has proven to be of limited effectiveness. At the same time, the European Union may increasingly resort to decision-making mechanisms that do not require unanimity among member states. Yet, their scope remains quite limited and cannot fully replace existing practices.

Moreover, more stringent measures – such as the suspension of voting rights – are difficult to achieve and require considerable time.

Consequently, if Viktor Orbán remains in power in Hungary, he will continue to pose significant challenges for the European Union and for those member states whose objective is to transform the EU into a global geopolitical actor.

Conclusion

Hungary’s elections extend beyond a contest between two political figures and form part of a broader geopolitical confrontation. For the Hungarian people, this vote effectively represents a referendum between two distinct models of state development. On the one hand stands a personalised authoritarian system, rooted in the instrumentalisation of nationalist sentiment; on the other, the prospect of restoring a democratic order based on institutional strengthening and accountability, which would re-anchor the country in a coordinated relationship with the European Union.

At the same time, these elections constitute a test for the European Union itself, highlighting whether it possesses the capacity to act effectively when a member state systematically obstructs common decision-making. The Hungarian case illustrates that the EU’s institutional framework remains insufficiently adapted to respond to situations in which the domestic political trajectory of a member state diverges from the broader European direction.

Ultimately, the outcome of the elections will shape not only Hungary’s future external orientation, but also the geopolitical dynamics that will emerge across Europe in the coming years. It is a decision that will have implications for the unity of the European Union as well as for transatlantic relations, and will demonstrate whether the EU is capable of acting as a coherent and influential actor in international politics.

April 2026