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The end of World War II and the new foreign policy of the United States

The United States played a leading role in establishing a liberal international order after World War II. This system was based on open markets, multilateral cooperation, democratic values, and collective security.

Washington played a crucial role in the establishment of organisations like the World Bank, the IMF, NATO, and the United Nations. The US plan was to work with allies and take a multilateral approach to tackling global problems. This was founded on the idea that a stable, peaceful, rules-based international order was in America’s best interest. This strategy was highly effective for the US. It became the world’s largest economy, won the Cold War, helped make the world more prosperous, and played an essential role in supporting democratic processes worldwide. US forward military presence and extended nuclear deterrence guarantees for allies made it easier for alliances to grow and get stronger quickly.

Through U.S. engagement, such as reducing tariff barriers, developing free-trade agreements, and founding new international financial institutions, global trade policy became easier to navigate. This helped create a system of free trade and made globalisation a major driver of peace and development. Despite criticism of post-war internationalism (including the argument that sustaining the liberal international order was extremely costly for the United States), no American president has fully abandoned the framework of the liberal international order to date.

Trump’s foreign policy can be better understood by comparing it with the doctrines and foreign policy approaches of Harry S. Truman, Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.

The Truman Doctrine vs. Trump’s Foreign Policy

The core of the Truman Doctrine was the policy of containing the Soviet Union—so-called “defensive containment”—which aimed to protect free nations from communist expansion. A hard and assertive foreign policy toward communism involved sending military advisers to countries facing communist threats, providing military assistance, conducting covert interventions through the Central Intelligence Agency, and, in some cases, direct military involvement. The Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO were developed under the Truman Doctrine. The United States saw itself as an ideological leader and the driving force of the “free world,” opposing totalitarian expansionism in defence of democracy, freedom, and sovereignty in different countries. Washington actively used the UN and NATO to contain the Soviet Union, while also acting directly when deemed necessary. Unlike Truman, Trump does not share the post–World War II idea that the United States should maintain permanent global dominance.

Where Truman’s doctrine framed the world as a confrontation between free and authoritarian systems, Trump’s view is non-ideological and transactional. Under this approach, the United States is willing to cooperate with any form of government, including non-democratic regimes, if there is mutual interest. One point of overlap between Trump and Truman is the desire to preserve a “balance of power” and prevent the rise of new hegemons, but only in regions that matter to the United States. At the same time, the Trump administration sees little value in spending resources to reduce the influence of great and middle powers.

In contrast to Trump’s approach, which avoids ideological conflict and focuses on highly specific concerns, the Truman Doctrine reflected a broader commitment to safeguarding the liberal world order. For instance, the Trump administration might question whether the crisis in this particular nation has a real effect on American security and economy; if not, it doesn’t see any need for engagement, even though the US under Truman backed Turkey and Greece to contain the Soviet Union. This shift helps explain why issues that were highly salient in previous decades may appear less relevant to today’s administration. It is clear that the long-established moral obligation of containment, such as supporting “free peoples and nations”, is gradually being replaced by a tougher realpolitik.

The Reagan Doctrine vs. Trump’s Policy

At the beginning of the 1980s, Reagan significantly intensified the ideological offence against the Soviet Union and openly supported anti-communist uprisings globally to reduce Soviet influence. He viewed regional conflicts through the prism of the Cold War and was prepared to take radical steps against communism. Washington supported the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua, UNITA in Angola, and other guerrilla groups fighting Marxist ideology. In effect, Reagan replaced Truman’s “defensive containment” with an offensive strategy aimed at weakening the Soviet Union.

In parallel, Reagan strengthened U.S. military capabilities and used uncompromising rhetoric against the “evil empire.” During his presidency, U.S. support for developing countries increased significantly. Despite criticism, these decisions were framed as a collective defence of freedom, and allies supported this logic. Reagan is widely credited with contributing substantially to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consolidation of a new liberal order.

Trump’s policy differs radically from Reagan’s vision. It is not grounded in a traditional political ideology and is driven by the pragmatic “America First” approach. For Trump, the key question is what material outcome a given policy delivers for the United States, while the ideological character of other countries is a secondary concern. For example, if Reagan helped anti-communist rebels in Afghanistan in line with U.S. national interests, Trump would likely prefer the role of mediator and seek to end conflicts through rapid “deals.” He cites the rapid diplomatic settlements of conflicts such as Israel–Iran, Azerbaijan–Armenia, and India–Pakistan as evidence of this approach. However, the durability of such peace over the long term remains uncertain. This is a diplomatic posture designed to avoid arming one side and instead prioritise swift conflict resolution through mediation, increasing America’s prestige at a “lower cost.”

Trump’s strategy views the growing influence of “patriotic parties” in allied European states positively, suggesting support for right-wing nationalist forces. He describes this process as a “revival of the European spirit.” Notably, while Reagan called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” and fought communism ideologically, Trump’s new strategy speaks about restoring strategic stability with Russia after ending the war in Ukraine, and the document largely no longer emphasises threats emanating from Russia. Trump’s attempts to reduce tensions with the Kremlin differ from Reagan’s confrontational posture, except in areas such as drug cartels, terrorism, and nuclear threats.

George W. Bush’s Doctrine vs. Trump’s Foreign Policy

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President Bush defined a new doctrine that supported preventive wars and unilateral action against rising threats. It also permitted the aggressive replacement of authoritarian regimes with democratic forces.

The U.S. National Security Strategy endorsed pre-emptive strikes against adversaries—representing a departure from Cold War containment. The Bush Doctrine was defined by four main pillars:

1. preventive action;
2. comprehensive U.S. military superiority;
3. unilateral action if collective steps were blocked;
4. spreading democracy worldwide as a long-term means of defeating terrorism.

Bush argued that replacing authoritarianism and dictatorship with democracy would produce peace. As a result of the invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, this tactic raised mistrust of global institutions like the UN. A strong interventionist policy characterised the Bush administration, as the US employed force even in the absence of obvious provocation. Washington also made significant investments in establishing democratic institutions in developing nations such as Georgia. This strategy sought to establish a global order based on American principles, including free markets, robust institutions, high democratic standards, and the rule of law.

Bush’s doctrine was expansive, focused on rapidly transforming the world into democratic systems. Trump’s policy is more defensive and nationalist, oriented toward protecting the United States while allowing other countries to “run their own affairs” so long as their behaviour does not directly threaten U.S. national interests. The main similarity between Bush and Trump is the independent character of their decision-making; however, in Trump’s case, this independence is largely confined to economic measures and selective military strikes.

Obama’s Policy vs. Trump’s Foreign Policy

After the wars of the 2000s and their negative economic consequences, Obama began reassessing U.S. foreign policy. Although he lacked a clear doctrine, his strategy tended toward “institutional realism,” which included “leading from behind” and interacting with partners, as demonstrated by the 2011 Libyan operation, in which the United States acted under UN/NATO frameworks. Obama favoured cooperative action with allies and believed that the United States should employ force only when its interests were directly threatened. This set him apart from Bush. Obama called for collaboration grounded in mutual respect and shared interests and committed significant resources to strengthening international institutions and partnerships. During his presidency, there were active kinetic operations against terrorist targets; Osama bin Laden was murdered at his direction, despite his belief that war was not always the best method to achieve outcomes.

His policy can be assessed as a strategy of selective engagement: the U.S. confronted threats such as terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation directly, while avoiding full-scale interventions. Obama also supported a “reset” policy with Russia, though it ultimately proved unsuccessful. His administration sought to combine American power with international consensus to support the development of the liberal international order. Nevertheless, it was during Obama’s presidency, in 2014, that Russia invaded Ukraine, often cited as one of his major foreign-policy failures.

Trump and Obama partially align in their intention to avert massive military conflicts. Trump’s motivation is primarily to evade additional costs rather than to adhere to international law and norms. For instance, Obama sought to avert a comprehensive military intervention in Syria to alter Bashar al-Assad’s administration; instead, the U.S. implemented international sanctions, supported the Syrian opposition, conducted limited airstrikes, and provided assistance to Kurdish forces against ISIS. During his initial term, Trump partially withdrew U.S. forces from Syria, thereby facilitating more influence for Turkey and Russia in the region.

Obama attached great importance to NATO and collective security. Under his leadership, the US deepened military ties with Pacific allies. By contrast, Trump’s new policy sharply criticises NATO and its European members, raising significant questions about the US posture toward NATO’s future.

Under Obama, the US pursued a mixed approach to engagement with adversaries through diplomacy and coordinated international sanctions. Under Trump, relations with competitors tend to swing between two extremes: (1) radical confrontation, as seen in the tariff war with China and the strike against Iran; and (2) personalised, transactional “deal-making,” as seen in the case of Russia. In short, Obama’s approach was based on multilateral cooperation, alliance unity, and limited use of force, while Trump’s policy prioritises U.S. autonomy, transactional approaches, and rapid gains, even if this comes at the expense of traditional alliances. It is clear that Trump does not favour alliances, and it is likely that the Obama (and similarly Biden) emphasis on strengthening alliances and institutions will regress during a Trump presidency, though this will also depend on whether European countries can build a more autonomous security system capable of deterring Russia.

Georgia in the New Reality

Trump’s policy and the 2025 US National Security Strategy, in some respects, represent a return to pre–World War II instincts, accompanied by a selective and tougher approach. The liberal international order of the past 80 years, whose main driving force was the United States, has come under question. In the near future, we may see Washington fully refocus on national sovereignty, expand economic protectionism, partially replace alliances with bilateral relationships, and deepen strategic pragmatism – trends that are already visible.

The United States continues to pursue economic and military strengthening, but not “for the good of the world,” but rather from the standpoint of its national interests. Washington’s revised perspective regards allies not as collaborators in a collective endeavour, but rather as autonomous entities seeking advantages from the United States while advancing their own interests. Adversaries are perceived not as ideological foes but as competitors with whom negotiation, bargaining, or balance of power is feasible.

This alteration in US foreign policy could adversely affect small, geographically remote nations such as Georgia. In light of regional challenges, Georgia has received robust US support at all levels since the 1990s. Trump’s policies have substantially transformed the regional and global political landscape, casting doubt on numerous topics concerning Georgia.

Georgia currently finds itself at a pivotal juncture. The conventional post–Cold War objectives such as enhancing the strategic alliance with the United States, seeking NATO and EU membership, and obtaining Western security assurances, are being confronted by both external and domestic influences.

Externally, Georgia is in a challenging position because of Trump’s doubts about NATO expansion, his propensity to stop supporting democratic processes elsewhere, and his change in priority to the Western Hemisphere.

Internally, there is a genuine risk of international isolation due to the political crisis, democratic regression, the government’s anti-Western rhetoric, and deteriorating relations with the West. Such strategies essentially go against Western values and aspirations, making EU and NATO integration unachievable.
In order to overcome these obstacles, Georgia needs to act quickly and decisively in the short and medium term to avoid losing its regional significance and being unprepared for threats.
Georgia must morally reestablish tight links with the US, NATO, and the EU despite the unpredictability of US foreign policy. Georgia will become isolated and exposed to China’s so-called “debt diplomacy” and Russia’s coercive tactics if it deviates from the Western orbit. Additionally, Georgia has to adopt a more aggressive approach to foreign policy implementation.

Georgia must see the international system through a wider lens, considering new coalitions and alliances, and transcend conventional foreign-policy frameworks in light of the current geopolitical situation. While new foreign policy directions and “centres of gravity” should emerge in accordance with Georgia’s national interests, Western integration must continue to be the top priority.

Although Trump’s new national security strategy questions NATO enlargement and criticises European allies, the United States remains Georgia’s most important potential security guarantor. At the same time, Georgia has an opportunity to demonstrate to the Trump administration its geopolitical value and the “price” that could become a political driver for restoring and deepening the strategic partnership with Washington. This requires identifying issues that matter to Georgia and also align with Trump’s transactional priorities. These may include Georgia’s strategic location, its experience in international peacekeeping missions, the possibility of involving American investors in the Anaklia deep-sea port, development of a digital corridor with US private sector engagement, revitalizing existing strategic projects, Georgia’s contribution to the TRIPP corridor, the usefulness of U.S. engagement in the “Middle Corridor,” Georgia’s potential role as a neutral arbiter for regional states, and more. Simply put, Georgia must clearly show Washington how close US–Georgia relations serve mutual interests.

Given changes in US policy, strengthening regional cooperation is essential, especially with countries that prioritise deterring Russia. In this case, Turkey is very important. Tbilisi should work to expand military cooperation with Ankara because Turkey is a NATO member and has historically worked to deter Russia in the Black Sea. In this case, the Georgian Armed Forces might get Turkish military tech, join in on more regional military cooperation, and do more joint drills. For instance, Turkish drones might be interesting because Azerbaijan is already using them in their military. Bringing Turkey into a sort of quasi-alliance with Georgia could help Georgia defend itself and give it more power in politics.

The Baltic states, Romania, Poland, and the United Kingdom are also important for Georgia, as they are NATO members and view Russia as a primary threat—much like Georgia does. With the right policy, these countries could increase military support for Georgia by providing equipment and resources, sharing experience, conducting joint exercises, and offering financial assistance. Cooperation could also evolve into thinking about more formal defence-alignment mechanisms.

Georgia can also work within existing formats such as the Three Seas Initiative and GUAM to promote the creation of military and security components, which can provide additional regional security mechanisms.

In defence terms, until international security guarantees are secured, Georgia’s total defence concept, focused on asymmetric deterrence and defence, may be effective for deterring an adversary. Such systems are tested in small states that border stronger, hostile powers.

Russia actively uses hybrid warfare elements against Georgia, including cyberattacks and disinformation. Strengthening cyber capabilities is therefore necessary, including the establishment of offensive cyber units inside the Ministry of Defence that are equipped to carry out cyber operations in real time. Georgia should advance psychological operations teams within the Ministry of Defence to combat propaganda and misinformation; Poland and other European nations have found success with this strategy. A national concept (strategy) for countering hybrid threats should also be developed, as well as an efficient Centre of Excellence focused on countering hybrid threats. The benefits of the integration process, such as improved defence capabilities, better alignment with NATO standards, and material support, must be provided to Georgia as an aspirant nation if NATO enlargement is postponed. In order to join NATO as soon as a political decision on enlargement is made, Georgia must fulfil all NATO requirements and continue to be prepared for membership.

Economically, America’s policy shift likely will not have a major direct impact on Georgia, since bilateral trade and economic relations are not large in scale. Nonetheless, Georgia faces a serious risk, which is dependence on the Russian market. Reducing this dependence is strategically vital, and the most effective mechanism is market diversification.

Today, the EU market is Georgia’s most stable and secure anchor. Accordingly, DCFTA should be fully utilised, requiring renewed reforms, increased production of high-standard export goods, and the use of EU candidate status to attract Western investment. An independent judiciary, genuinely low corruption, and a highly competitive environment would accelerate Georgia’s accession to the EU and increase inflows of European investment—though this is impossible under current policies.

To strengthen Georgia’s strategic role, cooperation with China within the “One Belt, One Road” initiative should be developed in a way that protects Georgia’s national interests. Any infrastructure project or decision must be assessed through the lens of economic value, the international environment, and sovereignty preservation. In addition, deepening cooperation with India and countries of East and Southeast Asia in high-tech investment and digital corridor development could be quite promising for Georgia.

The global environment is very hard to understand. If the US suddenly changed its strategy, it could cause huge changes in the international system and create a new geopolitical reality. The liberal international order has been in place for almost 80 years, but it might change a lot. Georgia needs to be ready.

In this situation, Georgia needs to appear as a sure-footed, moral, and values-driven participant that employs open-minded and practical diplomacy. This is the resource of a small state in a world that isn’t working well. To turn the country into a regional success story, Georgia needs to make the most of its geographical, historical, and intellectual possibilities. But this needs political will, healthy political processes, and a fair framework, which is exactly what the country doesn’t have right now.

Finally, even though there was a big change in Washington’s foreign policy, there is still a theoretical chance that the US could go back to backing the liberal international order. In this case, it’s important to think about disagreements about Trump’s foreign policy inside the Republican Party, the global political environment, and the 2026 US midterm elections, the results could have a big impact on US foreign policy.