Opinion
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History shows that each wave of the EU enlargement brings new challenges of institutional, political, and economic nature. Without proper pre-enlargement reforms, these challenges can create institutional deadlocks and cause frustration among member states. MEP Sandro Gozi, rapporteur on the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations, warns that an enlarged Union “would risk paralysis,”[1] exposing itself to internal blackmail and inefficiency, as evidenced by the recent actions of Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán. It is quite obvious for the vast majority of EU researchers that, without adapting its institutions, decision-making mechanisms, and budgetary frameworks, the EU would not be able to integrate new members. Moving ahead requires a dual approach. First, candidate countries should meet all the democratic and institutional standards. At the same time, the EU needs to be ready—structurally and procedurally—to welcome these new members.

For Eastern Neighbourhood Countries – whose European perspective was formally recognised and whose accession path may soon become a tangible reality – this debate carries direct significance. The question is not only whether they will join, but what kind of Union they will be joining. Citizens in all candidate countries deserve clarity on the nature of the political community they aspire to enter: what rights and benefits EU membership entails, and what obligations and responsibilities it brings.

When it comes to EU reform, there are three significant, connected challenges. Decision-making has to get more efficient. The EU’s democratic institutions need to be seen as legitimate and trustworthy. And the EU has to be able to act strategically, especially given how fast the world is changing these days. Only by confronting these dimensions together can the EU remain not just an area of prosperity and law, but a solid and confident actor capable of shaping its destiny and that of its future members.[2]

I. Efficiency and Governance

As mentioned, institutional efficiency is the cornerstone of any future enlargement. The unanimity decision requirement in key policy areas, like Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Taxation, Budget, etc., has long served as a symbol of member-state sovereignty. But now it often functions as a limitation. In a Union approaching thirty or more members, the persistence of unanimity risks paralysing collective action and undermining public confidence in the EU’s ability to respond swiftly to crises.[3] The debate over qualified majority voting (QMV)[4] illustrates this tension between inclusivity and functionality. On one hand, smaller states fear marginalisation, on the other, the EU’s inability to take timely decisions, such as on sanctions, migration, or defence cooperation, poses a far greater risk to the Union’s credibility.[5]

Reform proposals emerging from the European Parliament and various expert groups advocate a step-by-step extension of QMV, starting with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).[6] Yet efficiency is not only a question of voting rules, it also concerns institutional balance. The European Council’s dominance in recent years has overshadowed the Commission’s executive role and constrained the Parliament’s democratic oversight. It would be essential to restore a more symmetrical governance structure that will empower the supranational institutions, while enhancing the Council’s strategic steering capacity rather than its day-to-day management.

Moreover, the EU must strengthen the link between budgetary flexibility and strategic priorities. The current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) reflects a logic of compromise rather than vision. A reformed system should introduce a dedicated “Strategic Capacity Budget” to enable the Union to fund rapid responses to security and industrial challenges without protracted negotiations. Similarly, the long-debated issue of own resources must be resolved if the EU is to sustain ambitious policies in defence, innovation, and energy.[7] Efficiency, therefore, should not be mistaken for austerity: it is about aligning institutional mechanisms with political purpose.

II. Reconnecting the Union with Its Citizens

Institutional efficiency, however, cannot substitute for democratic legitimacy. The legitimacy deficit remains the EU’s most persistent structural vulnerability. Despite the European Parliament’s enhanced powers, citizens often perceive the Union as distant, technocratic, and unaccountable.[8] The reform must aim not only to make the EU work better but to make its citizens feel more represented and responsive.

A central question concerns the balance between supranational democracy and national accountability. So far, the European Parliament is the only directly elected transnational body. Despite this, voter turnout, though improving, remains uneven. Proposals for transnational lists and a uniform electoral procedure could inject a genuine European dimension into parliamentary politics, fostering debate across borders rather than within them. At the same time, national parliaments should play a stronger role in scrutinising EU policies, particularly in areas such as migration or green transition, where domestic implications are profound. The establishment of a European inter-parliamentary platform could help bridge the gap between national and EU-level discussion.

Legitimacy also depends on transparency and performance. The Union’s success in joint vaccine procurement, energy coordination, and the recovery fund after the pandemic demonstrated that citizens support European solutions when they deliver tangible results.[9] In contrast, failures in migration or foreign policy make people feel more disconnected.

Therefore, democratic reform must be supported by a results-oriented governance culture that translates complex procedures into tangible public goods. The EU must clearly explain its goals to its citizens and present itself not as an elite-driven project, but as a collective instrument of protection and empowerment.[10] Otherwise, populist and anti-EU movements will use public dissatisfaction to weaken further and fragment the EU. The reforms should build trust in EU institutions and strengthen people’s sense of belonging. In this way, legitimacy complements efficiency.

III. Strategic Autonomy and the EU’s Global Role

Institutional and democratic reforms are inseparable from the EU’s global ambitions. The notion of “strategic autonomy,” initially limited to discussions on defence, has evolved to cover broader areas, including economic security, technological independence, and the robustness of supply chains.[11] But autonomy without institutional coherence risks becoming an empty slogan. The Union cannot act as a geopolitical actor if it remains internally divided and procedurally constrained.

The war in Ukraine has exposed both the Union’s strengths and vulnerabilities. On the one hand, the EU has demonstrated unprecedented unity in sanctions, financial support, and military assistance. On the other hand, the reliance on ad hoc instruments such as the European Peace Facility and intergovernmental mechanisms reveals the fragility of the current system. Reform must therefore aim to integrate these instruments within the EU legal framework, ensuring parliamentary oversight and long-term sustainability.

A credible strategic role also requires capacity—both financial and industrial. Initiatives such as the European Defence Fund and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) mark essential steps, but they remain fragmented and modest in scale.[12] A European Defence Union would necessitate shared procurement, common standards, and a permanent funding mechanism. Here again, the challenge is political, not technical: without a collective will to pool sovereignty, efficiency and legitimacy will remain theoretical.

Furthermore, strategic autonomy must coexist with openness. The EU’s global credibility depends on its capacity to uphold the rules-based order, not retreat from it. Enlargement policy, in this sense, is both a geopolitical tool and a moral test. Integrating new members will strengthen Europe’s stability and influence, but only if institutional reform ensures the Union remains governable. A “multi-speed” or “differentiated integration” model may provide a pragmatic path, allowing willing states to advance together without creating permanent hierarchies.

Conclusion

The EU reform debate isn’t just about changing institutions. It’s about rethinking what ties Europeans together in the first place. Efficiency, legitimacy, and strategic strength—they all point to one thing: making the EU work in today’s world. But at the same time, reform shouldn’t turn into an excuse to keep putting off enlargement. Instead, it should be the enabling framework that allows it to succeed. Without reforms, the EU cannot integrate new members without losing coherence. But if the Union adapts, then bringing in new countries can give it new energy.

The EU’s reputation, both as a global player and as a community built on shared values, rests on its ability to change from the inside. The choice is clear: adapt and move forward, or get stuck and fall apart. With global tensions rising, tech evolving fast, and democracy under pressure, Europe can’t afford to hit pause. Reform isn’t just a nice idea—it’s survival.

Endnotes