Opinion
Papers

Ukraine at the Core of Europe’s Security

At the heart of this frontier lies Ukraine. Its security and resilience are central not only to its own sovereignty but to the stability of the wider region. Over the past three years, Ukraine has become a cornerstone of Europe’s security order. A victorious and stable Ukraine would secure the continent’s eastern flank, counter Moscow’s imperial ambitions, and provide Europe with the strategic depth it has long lacked. Conversely, a weakened or fragmented Ukraine would expose Europe to hybrid threats, economic disruption, and the expansion of Russian influence into neighbouring states, underscoring how incomplete Europe’s integration and security remain without a strong, sovereign Ukraine at its eastern edge.

Today, there is much discussion about security guarantees and financial assistance for Kyiv, all of which is important. However, it is crucial to recall past instances in which numerous promises, including signed agreements and memoranda, were broken or disregarded. This extends beyond Budapest 1994; when it comes to Russia, breaches of agreements have been the norm rather than the exception. Georgians and Ukrainians can attest to this reality.

When it comes to actual security guarantees, there is no substitute for membership in the EU and NATO. The road may be long, but the goal must remain credible and the process alive. Much depends on how the war ends, or more precisely, on the document that stops it. A peace that limits Ukraine’s sovereignty or blocks its path to the EU would weaken the credibility of the EU’s enlargement policy. It would show that even the most dedicated reformers can be abandoned when pressure mounts. Such a message would stall democratic change across the region and strengthen anti-European narratives. In Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and the Western Balkans, Russian-backed forces would eagerly use it to argue that the EU cannot be trusted when it truly matters.

For NATO, even if Ukraine’s accession is difficult under current conditions, it must never be formally removed from the agenda. The Alliance is built on consensus, and no single member should hold veto power over another nation’s Euro-Atlantic future. History reminds us why: when President Yeltsin asked President Clinton to block NATO expansion to former Soviet republics, Clinton refused—insisting he could not speak for all allies or accept new dividing lines in Europe. That principle must hold today.

Quite often, we have heard claims that NATO’s post-Cold War eastward expansion drove Russia’s alienation from the West and fueled its revisionist policies. Let me be clear: Georgia 2008, Crimea and Donbass 2014, and Ukraine 2022 are not the result of NATO expansion, but the consequence of NATO enlargement left incomplete. Need proof? Look at the Russia–Ukraine border or the Russia–Georgia border, and then look at the Russia–Estonia border. Now imagine if the Baltic countries had been denied NATO membership and later EU membership at Russia’s insistence. The risks for Europe’s security today would have been catastrophic.

The Kremlin’s War Beyond Ukraine

Russia is fighting not only in Ukraine. The Kremlin is waging war on multiple fronts: in Georgia, in Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Hungary and Slovakia, in Austria and across the European Union, and even in the United States. These are not isolated domestic crises within individual countries but elements of a broader geopolitical confrontation, one that Vladimir Putin himself outlined in his famous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. At the time, many dismissed his words as bluster. But he was not bluffing. Putin has a record of stating his intentions openly; the problem is that we often refuse to believe him.

This confrontation is multidimensional. Its weapons are not only drones and ballistic missiles but also propaganda and disinformation, deployed to paralyse economies, disrupt governance, manipulate public discourse, erode trust in democratic institutions, and sow division within societies. In many ways, these tools are even more destructive than conventional arms. Their reach penetrates more deeply than any missile, and no defence system, not even the US nuclear umbrella or NATO’s Article V, can protect against them.

That is why the West must treat Russian disinformation as seriously as conventional military threats, even on par with weapons of mass destruction. This requires more than rhetorical commitment. The EU’s Strategic Communications Task Forces must be strengthened with greater resources and authority. NATO’s Centre of Excellence for Strategic Communications and Cooperative Cyber Defence should be integrated into alliance-wide resilience planning. Sanctions should target not only state propagandists but also private individuals who enable disinformation campaigns. Sustained support for independent media and civil society in vulnerable states is necessary, as they provide a first line of defence against disinformation and manipulation.

Unless these measures are put in place, Moscow will continue to win battles without firing a shot, thus reshaping Europe’s security landscape from within and undermining the very foundations of its democracy.

Georgia: A Case Study in Hybrid Warfare

Georgia can serve as an important case study in understanding the evolution of Russian multidimensional warfare tactics. In August 2008, when Russian tanks stood within 50 kilometres of Tbilisi, the appearance of five European leaders in the Georgian capital and a televised statement from the U.S. president halted Moscow’s advance. Yet, what Russia failed to achieve with tanks on the ground, it has pursued with far greater success through less conventional means: soft power, propaganda, and disinformation.

Over the past decade, Russia has targeted Georgia’s political institutions, media landscape, and civil society. State-aligned media outlets have amplified Kremlin narratives, spreading disinformation about NATO, the EU, and sowing distrust and polarisation in society. Some clergy within the Orthodox Church have been leveraged to reinforce conservative narratives aligned with Moscow, influencing public opinion on foreign policy and domestic reforms. These hybrid tactics are designed not to conquer territory but to weaken democratic resilience, undermine confidence in reforms, and reverse Georgia’s European integration, ultimately achieving the same results as military intervention and the annexation of a sovereign state.

This is a far more effective way to subjugate the country. Unlike conventional aggression, hybrid tactics are more complex to deter: sanctions cannot easily be applied to narratives, and the international community has yet to define a framework for holding Russia accountable for deploying disinformation as a weapon of war. The Georgian experience demonstrates that safeguarding democracy, stability, and sovereignty requires more than traditional military deterrence; it demands a coordinated strategy that protects institutions, empowers citizens, and secures the information environment. This approach should serve as a blueprint for supporting countries on Europe’s eastern frontier, ensuring that the region remains stable, secure, and aligned with democratic values.

Despite its current political turmoil, Georgia remains strategically important for Europe. Once a role model for democratic reforms, it remains one of the most pro-European societies in the Eastern Partnership. Its significance lies not in domestic energy resources, but as a transit corridor linking Europe with the Caspian region and Central Asia.

The Eastern Frontier as Europe’s Future

Equally crucial for the stability of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood is sustained progress toward a lasting settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. A credible peace agreement would open long-blocked transport routes, facilitate trade between the Black Sea and the Caspian, and foster conditions for regional economic cooperation. Such an outcome would help anchor the South Caucasus more firmly within Europe’s wider framework of stability and development, while reducing Russia’s leverage and mitigating the risk of renewed hostilities.

To advance these goals, the EU must assume a more proactive role: supporting Georgia’s civil society, safeguarding democratic progress, applying constructive pressure on the government in Tbilisi, and facilitating the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process. A stable and connected South Caucasus would strengthen the resilience of the EU’s eastern frontiers — transforming a region long seen as a buffer zone into a bridge linking Europe with Asia.

Closely tied to Ukraine’s future is Moldova. A prosperous Ukraine would give Moldova the space to strengthen its institutions, diversify its energy supplies, and advance further on its path toward the European Union. Without that stability to its east, Moldova would face greater risks of political pressure and external interference. Supporting Moldova, therefore, remains an essential element in consolidating Europe’s eastern security frontier.

In the longer run, Belarus cannot be disregarded. Today, firmly aligned with Moscow, it serves as a platform for Russian military operations. If Belarus remains under Moscow’s control, Europe’s northern and eastern flanks remain vulnerable, limiting its strategic depth and constraining its ability to respond effectively to Russian aggression. If Europe fails to plan for a future where Belarus might turn away from Russian control, it will leave a gap in its security system. Therefore, engaging with Belarusian civil society, supporting independent institutions, and maintaining a long-term vision for its eventual reintegration into a stable, European-aligned order are essential steps. Without them, Europe risks leaving a key part of its eastern frontier exposed to ongoing instability and coercion.

Just as the Baltic and Adriatic Seas are integral to Europe’s collective defence and economic lifelines, the Black Sea serves as a strategic crossroads between Europe, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. Control over its waters determines not only trade and energy flows but also the balance of power on NATO’s eastern flank. Ensuring freedom of navigation and deterring Russian militarisation in the Black Sea is therefore as essential for Europe’s long-term security as safeguarding the Baltic and Adriatic.

Conclusion: The Defining Frontier of the 21st Century

The future of Europe’s relations with Russia will ultimately be determined not in high-level diplomatic communiqués, but on this frontier. If Europe succeeds in anchoring its eastern border through integration, resilience, and solidarity, Russia will have no choice but to adapt to a new reality in which imperial revisionism is contained and cooperation must be pursued on Europe’s terms. If it fails, Moscow will continue to exploit divisions, project instability, and undermine Europe from within.

Therefore, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the South Caucasus, and ultimately Belarus are not peripheral theatres of Europe’s concern but decisive battlegrounds for its future. Supporting them is not an act of generosity, but a strategic necessity. Consider it as a hard-power investment in Europe’s own survival and autonomy.

The new European project will therefore stand or fall on the eastern frontier. Only by securing this border can Europe define a stable and sustainable relationship with Russia, and only then can it build the prosperity and security that will ensure its role in the 21st century.